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I. Introduction
Mamma.com

CEO

Guy Faure

emailed Mark

Cuban on the evening of June 28, 2004, asking Cuban to
contact him as soon as possible. 1 Cuban called Faure less
than five minutes later. 2 Faure apparently opened the
call by saying, "I've got confidential information." 3 Cuban
appears to have responded by saying something like,
Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law.
at 3, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F.Supp.2d 713 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 17, 2008) (No. 3-08CV2050-D).
2 Id.
3 SEC v. Cuban, 2013 WL 791405, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5,
2013).
*

1 Complaint
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"Okay, uh huh, go ahead." 4 Faure then informed Cuban
of Mamma.com's planned private investment in public
equity ("PIPE") offering, which would dilute the value of
Cuban's existing holdings in the company (6.3 percent of
the firm's outstanding shares at the time). 5 As both Faure
and the Mamma.com board members expected, Cuban
"flew off the handle" when he heard the news. 6 Cuban is
purported to have then said, "Well, now I'm screwed. I
can't sell," apparently reflecting his view at that moment
that insider trading laws would preclude his sale until
after the public announcement of the PIPE.7 Faure
invited Cuban to contact Arnold Owen, the investment
banker handling the PIPE, for more detailed
information. 8 After speaking with Owen later that day,
Cuban called his broker and instructed him to sell out of
his entire 600,000 share position in Mamma.com. 9
Cuban's broker sold 10,000 shares after hours on June
28, and then sold the remaining 590,000 shares on June
29.10
The public announcement of the PIPE offering

was made after the market close on June 29.11 In the
week following the PIPE announcement, Mamma.com

shares declined almost 40 percent, and Cuban avoided a
loss of more than $750,000 by selling in advance of the
4 Id.
5 A PIPE offering is method of raising capital by issuing new
shares to private investors at discounted price. Insofar as a
PIPE will increase the number of outstanding shares by selling
new shares at a price below current market value, the value of
the existing shareholders' stock will be diluted. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 3-4, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F.Supp.2d 713 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (No. 3-08CV2050-D).
6 Id. at 4.
7 Id.
8 SEC v. Cuban. 2013 WL 791405, at *5.
9 Complaint at 5, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F.Supp.2d 713 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (No. 3-08CV2050-D).
10 Id.
11

Id.
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announcement. 12 The SEC brought an insider trading
enforcement action against Cuban. 13 After many years of
costly litigation, a jury found Cuban not liable for insider
trading in October of 2013.14 Business Insider reported at
the time that "Cuban spent more on the suit than he
would have if he'd just paid the penalty, but he wanted to
prove a point: The SEC never should have gone after
him." 15 According to Cuban, "It's personal. You take all
these years of my life, it's personal." 16
Similar facts supported a British Financial
Services Authority (FSA) action against American hedge
fund manager, David Einhorn. 17 On March 8, 2009, a
representative of Punch Taverns Plc., reached out to an
analyst at Einhorn's fund, Greenlight Capital Inc., to
raise the possibility of a new equity issuance and to
inquire as to whether Greenlight would agree to be "wall
crossed" (i.e., commit to confidentiality and not to trade)
in order to receive more information.18 Greenlight was
then owner of 13.3 percent of Punch's outstanding
shares. 19 The request was elevated to Einhorn, who
immediately refused the invitation. 20 Despite this
SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2010).
See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F.Supp.2d (N.D. Tex.
2008) (No. 3-08CV2050-D).
14 See, e.g., Jana Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of
Insider Trading; Blasts U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16,
2013, 3:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-seccuban-verdict-idUSBRE99F0ZM20131016.
15 Erin Fuchs, Why The SEC Lost Its Big Case Against Mark
12

13

Cuban, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2013, 3:54 PM), https://ww

w.businessinsider.com/how-mark-cuban-defeated-the-sec
2013-10.
16 Pruet, supra note 14.
17 See Financial Services Authority "Final Notice" to David
Einhorn (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/fin

al-notices/david-einhorn.pdf.
18
Id. para. 2.4, 3.8.
19 Id. para. 2.2.
20
Id. para. 2.4.
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refusal, Punch arranged a call with Einhorn on June 9 to
discuss the equity issuance on a "non-wall crossed"
basis. 2 1 During that call, Einhorn was advised of the
purpose, timing, and size of the proposed issuance. 22 The
call convinced Einhorn that Greenlight should begin
selling its holdings in Punch, and he gave his analysts
instructions to do just that. 23 Starting the day of the call,
Greenlight began a massive selloff of Punch shares,
reducing its holdings from 13.3 percent of outstanding
shares on June 9 to 8.9 percent on June 12.24
Greenlight's selloff allowed the hedge fund to
avoid £5.8 million in losses when the June 15
announcement of the issuance was followed by a 29.9
percent drop in the value of Punch shares. 25 These events
were soon followed by an FSA action against Einhorn for
"market abuse" by insider dealing pursuant to §118 of the
British Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000.26
Despite claiming that his conduct resembled "insider
dealing as much as soccer resembles football," Einhorn
and his hedge fund settled and paid, collectively, a fine of
$11.2 million. 27 Though Einhorn claimed that he only
settled because he doubted his "chances of having a fair
hearing," 28 a review of the UK's market abuse statute,
21 Id.
22

Financial Services Authority "Final Notice" to David Einhorn
at para. 2.6 (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.fca.org.uk/publicat
ion/final-notices/david-einhorn.pdf.
23 Id. para. 2.7.
24 Id.
25
Id. para. 2.8.
26 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 3, § 118;
Financial Services Authority "Final Notice" to David Einhorn,
supra note 17, at para. 1.

27 Julia La Roche, DavidEinhorn Tells His Side of the Story on
the FSA's Insider Trading Fine, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan 26,
2012, 8:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/davideinhorn-tells-his-side-of-the-story-on-the-fsas-insider-tradingfine-2012-1.
28 Id.
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which embraces a broad "parity of information" model,
leaves little doubt that he was liable. 29
The similarities between the insider trading
stories of Mark Cuban and David Einhorn suggest that
their circumstances are not uncommon, and the
contrasting results also help to illustrate some significant
differences between the common law fraud-based insider
trading regime in the U.S. and the statutory parity-of-

information regime in Europe.30 And, as Congress and
the SEC continue to weigh the merits of reform in the
U.S.,31 the examples of Cuban and Einhorn are
particularly instructive for the reasons to be developed in
the remaining sections of this Article. First, as will be
explained in Part II of this Article, contrasting the
enforcement actions against Cuban and Einhorn throw
into stark relief the lack of ex ante guidance under the
U.S. regime for good-faith traders who must make realtime decisions for themselves and for those who are
relying upon them to invest their money. The examples
help to illustrate why the ethics of legal certainty, due
process, and the principle of legality weigh in favor of
29 See infra, Section II.
30 See infra, Section II.
31 For example, on December 5, 2019, a proposed statutory
overhaul of the current insider trading enforcement regime the
United States, the Insider Trading Prohibition Act (H.R. 2534)
was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on a 410-13
vote. See Andrew Ramonas, House PassesBill to Codify Insider
Trading Ban, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2019, 3:03 PM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/house-passes-bill-tocodify-insider-trading-ban. The SEC has also demonstrated an
interest in reform. In October of 2018, SEC Commissioner
Robert J. Jackson and former U.S. attorney for Manhattan,
Preet Bharara, announced the creation of the "Bharara Task
Force on Insider Trading" to propose new reforms to the law.

See Preet Bharara and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Insider Trading
Laws Haven't Kept Up with the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9,

2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinionn/sec-insid
er-trading-united-states.html.
[52]
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following Europe in adopting a relatively clear statutory
insider trading enforcement regime. Second, however, it
will be argued in Part II of this Article that if statutory
reform is needed in the U.S., the liability imposed upon
Einhorn despite the fact that his conduct (as I will argue)
was neither deceptive nor unfair, shows why adopting the
Europe's broad parity-of-information model would be a
mistake.
II. Ethics of Legal Certainty

Insider trading law has never been expressly
defined by statute or rule in the United States. 32 Hence,
to date, Congress and the SEC have been content to allow
the scope of insider trading liability to develop through
the common law. The principal statutory authority for
the prohibition is found in section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which is a general "catchall"33 antifraud provision proscribing the employment of "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
"connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 34
Though adopted In 1934, section 10(b) was not used as an
insider trading enforcement tool until the early 1960s. 35
For the first two decades of insider trading enforcement,
32 See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Insider Tainting: Strategic

Tipping ofMaterialNonpublic Information, 112 NW. U. L. REV.
725, 739 (2018) (noting that "no statute or rule defines 'insider
trading."').
33 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)
(recognizing Section 10(b) as a "catchall" provision).
34 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a), (b) (2012). Section 10(b) is implemented
by the SEC in Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, which proscribes "any
act, practice, or course of business which operated or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, In connection

with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5(c) (2016).
35 The SEC concluded its first insider trading enforcement
action in 1961. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961).
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the SEC read a broad "parity-of-information" or "equal
access" rule into section 10(b), whereby "virtually anyone
who possessed material nonpublic information was
required either to disclose it before trading or abstain
from trading in the affected company's securities,"3 6 and
the federal courts gave their imprimatur. 37 The Supreme
Court did not, however, visit the issue of insider trading
until 1980, when, in Chiarella v. United States, 38 the
Court explicitly rejected the parity-of-information
enforcement model as ultra vires.39
The Chiarella Court made it clear that while
section 10(b) is indeed a general "catchall" provision,
"what it catches must be fraud." 40 But the insider trader's
silence while buying or selling a security over an
anonymous exchange is only deceptive (and therefore
fraudulent) if the insider has a duty to disclose. 4 1 The
Supreme Court has recognized two theories whereby a
trader owes such a duty to disclose. Under the "classical"
theory, insider trading liability is triggered where a
corporate insider (actual or constructive) seeks to benefit
from trading (or tipping others who trade) their firm's
material nonpublic information. 42 Here, the insider's
failure to disclose her information advantage violates a
"fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence" to the counterparty to the transaction, the
firm's current or prospective shareholders. 43 Insider
trading liability arises under the "misappropriation"
36

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY

3-4 (2014).
37 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848
(2d Cir. 1968).
38 Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
39 Id. at 233 ("neither Congress nor the Commission ever has
adopted a parity-of-information rule.").
4

0

41

Id. at 235.

Id.

See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-652 (1997).
43 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
42
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outsider)
theory
where
anyone
(insider
or
misappropriates material nonpublic information and
then seeks to benefit by trading on the basis of it (or by
tipping others who trade on it) without first disclosing the
intent to trade to the source of the information. 44 The
misappropriation trader's failure to disclose breaches a
fiduciary duty of trust and confidence to the source of the
information by "dup[ing]" the source out of their "right of
exclusive use" of that information. 45
Although these two theories of section 10(b)
insider trading liability are well-established, the
common-law development of their elements has yielded a
great deal of uncertainty. As former U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara and SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson recently
explained, the current "insider trading laws do not
clearly define what the standard" for liability is, and the
"result is a legal haziness that leaves both investors and
defendants unclear about what sorts of informationsharing or other activities by investors would be
considered insider trading." 46 This author has written
extensively on numerous problems of vagueness
resulting from the common-law development of the U.S.
insider trading law, 47 but there is one ambiguity that
warrants particular attention in the context of the Cuban
case.

44 JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND

REFORM 59 (2018).
45 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 643.
46 See, e.g., Bharara & Jackson, supranote 31.
47 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supranote 43.1, at 59-117 (arguing that
the common law articulations of crucial terms such as when
information is "material" or "nonpublic," or when trading is "on
the basis" of information, or the parameters of the relevant
"relation of trust and confidence," or what constitutes the
relevant mental state requirement for insider trading liability,
etc., are so vague as to leave market participants with
insufficient advance notice of when their trading will incur
liability).
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The Cuban case brought to the fore one of the

more pertinent unsettled questions in U.S. insider
trading law, that is, whether a mere contractual or other
commitment to confidentiality (without more) is
sufficient to create a duty not to trade. 48 It appears that
Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 10(b)
offers one answer, and an SEC rule, 10b5-2, adopted in
2000, appears to offer another. 49 As noted above, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the SEC's
statutory authority in Section 10(b) requires that there
must be a breach of a conjunctive fiduciary duty of "trust
and confidence" to incur insider trading liability.5 0 SEC
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), however, provides that liability may be
incurred by the breach of a disjunctive duty of "trust or
confidence." 51 The district court sided with Cuban against
the SEC in holding that liability requires an express or
implied commitment not to trade (duty of trust or loyalty)
in addition to any commitment not to disclose (or keep
the information in confidence), 52 but the Second Circuit
refused to settle the question on appeal, noting only that:
Given the paucity of jurisprudence on the
question
of what
constitutes
a
relationship of 'trust and confidence' and
the inherently fact-bound nature of
determining whether such a duty exists,
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supranote 36, at 168-170.
49 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2001).
50 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S at 228, Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S.
646, 654 (1983), O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; Salman v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016).
51 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-2 (2001).
52 SEC v. Cuban, 643 F.Supp.2d 713, 725 (2009) ("The
agreement . . must consist of more than an express or implied
promise merely to keep information confidential. It must also
impose on the party who receives the information the legal
duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the
information for personal gain.").
48

[56]
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we decline to first determine or place our
thumb on the scale in the district court's
determination of its presence or to now
draw the contours of any liability that it
might bring, including the force of Rule
1Ob5-2(b)(1).53
The appellate court's punt on this important issue
offers little comfort or guidance to the next shareholder
who finds herself in Cuban's shoes-especially for those
who lack Cuban's resources to defend against an insider
trading investigation. 54 And with civil penalties of
disgorgement and up to "three times the profit gained or
loss avoided" by the trading, 55 and criminal fines of up to
$5 million and twenty years of imprisonment 56 (setting

aside entirely the harm to reputation and the high costs
of representation in even a successful insider trading
defense), the stakes are high indeed. 57
Professor Jeanne Schroeder has noted the fact
that insider trading law in the U.S. is almost exclusively
judge-made is a "scandal" in itself.58 This is because, as
53 SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2010).
54 See Jana J. Pruet, BillionaireMark Cuban clearedof insider
trading; blasts U.S. government, REUTERS: BUSINESS NEWS (Oct.

16, 2013, 3:44 PM) (noting that "Cuban refused to settle the
case and went to trial, even though he said on Wednesday that
he had spent more on fees for lawyers than the possible fines
for admitting insider trading"), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-sec-cuban-verdict-idUSBRE99F0ZM20131016.
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2018).
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2018).
57 Civil and criminal penalties have sometimes been described
as "draconian." See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating

State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1995) (noting
that insider trading "carries penalties that can only be
described as draconian.").
58 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Taking Stock: Insider and Outsider
Trading by Congress, 5 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 159, 163
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Professor Miriam Baer and others have explained,
insider trading, as a common-law crime, flirts with
violating the Western liberal jurisprudential principal of
legality. 59 The principle of legality "is the basic premise

of criminal law that 'conduct is not criminal unless
forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such
conduct is criminal."' 6 0 The principle of legality is
regarded as "a more or less self-evident maxim of justice
at least since the French Revolution," 6 1 and is based in at
least four related principles:
(1) the ancient rule of nullem crimin sine
lege ("no crime without a law"); (2) the
prohibition of retroactively criminalizing

conduct (e.g., ex post facto laws); (3) the
ancient rule of nullem poena sine lege ("no
punishment without law") . . . ; and (4)
the prohibition against the retroactive
imposition of more severe penalties than
previously authorized. 62
As I've noted elsewhere, the principle of legality
"gives expression to our shared intuition that justice
requires that persons be given reasonable notice of when
criminal sanctions will be imposed. Otherwise persons
(2014) (noting the "jurisprudential scandal that insider trading
is largely a federal common law offense").

59 See Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading'sLegality Problem, 127
YALE L.J.F. 129, 134-138 (2017); see also John P. Anderson,
Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From
Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV.

339, 369-371 (2015).

State v. Robbins, 986 So. 32d 828, 835 (La. App. 2 Cir 2008)
(citing Heyward D. Armstrong, Rogers v. Tennessee: An Assault
on Legality and Due Process, 81 N.C.L.REv. 317, 321-22
(2002)).
60

61

DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 193

(1977).
62
Id. at 835.
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would be left helpless in planning their lives to avoid such
sanctions."6 3 These ethical commitments are also
reflected in the ex post facto law and due process clauses
of the U.S. Constitution. 64
The vagueness doctrine is an "outgrowth" of the
Due Process Clause, and it provides that a criminal
conviction "fails to comport with due process if the statute
under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or
is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages
seriously discriminatory enforcement." 65 It has been
explained that there is no express statutory guidance as
what conduct incurs criminal liability for insider trading,
and it has been argued that even the common law and
administrative guidance is unclear, and sometimes even
conflicting. 66 The Cuban case offers only one (but a
nevertheless very compelling) example of how this
confusion and ambiguity in the law unjustly places wellmeaning traders in the awkward position of being totally
clueless as to whether their trading will expose them to
massive fines and significant jail time. 67 Neither
experienced Wall Street traders, nor large-firm
attorneys, nor law professors, nor even judges can say
with certainty whether misappropriation trading

liability will be triggered by one who trades while under
mere duty of confidentiality (as suggested by SEC Rule
lOb5-2's imposition of liability for trading while under a
duty of "trust or confidence"), or whether liability is only
triggered where there is also an express or implied duty
63 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 89.

64 See U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 9-10 (neither Congress nor the
states may pass ex post facto laws); U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV
(no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law" by either the federal government or the
several states).
65

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).

66 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 89-91.
67

SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
[59]
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of loyalty not to trade (as suggested by the Supreme
Court's requirement of a duty of "trust and confidence"). 68
If such experts cannot advise a trader ex ante on whether
their trading will trigger insider trading liability, it

seems a significant stretch to suggest that a person of
ordinary intelligence has fair notice of when their trading
crosses the line. 69 But regardless of whether the insider
trading regime in the United States is unconstitutionally
vague (as some have argued), 70 my goal in the preceding

has simply been to point out the serious moral concerns
that are raised by imposing harsh civil and criminal
penalties for conduct covered by such constantlychanging, common-law rules that are riddled with
uncertainty.

Vagueness under U.S. law is starkly contrasted by
the relatively clear statutory guidance offered by
Europe's insider trading enforcement regime. The
enforcement action against Einhorn came pursuant to a
detailed statutory scheme that implements a broad
parity-of-information regime. 71 Though the U.K.'s
statutory regime (implemented in compliance with the
European Market Abuse Regulation) 72 employs some
inherently imprecise elements like that of materiality, it
68 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 77-78.
69 ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 89.
70 See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Manne's Insider Trading Thesis and

Other Failures of Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949
(1985).
71 See Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 369, 386 (2013) (noting
that the United Kingdom embraces "the parity-of-information"
approach to insider trading enforcement).
72 MAR went into effect on July 3, 2016, though its prohibitions do not
vary significantly from the Market Abuse Directive of 1989 that
preceded it. The principal difference is that MAR binds each European
Union member state directly. See New EU rules to fight insider dealing
and market manipulation in Europe's financial markets take effect,
EUROPEAN

COMMISSION:

PRESS

CORNER

(Jul.

1,

2016),

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2352_en.htm?locale=EN.
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defines the scope of insider dealing liability with
admirable clarity. 73 In the U.K. (as in all European
countries under MAR), essentially anyone who "knows, or
could reasonably be expected to know" that they are
trading on material nonpublic information is subject to
insider trading liability. 74 No subtle analysis of commonlaw precedent concerning the nature of fiduciary duties
(and whether they impose a duty of "trust and
confidence" or "trust or confidence") is required to
determine the boundary of liability under the European
model. 75 The trader need only ask herself if the
information is "likely to have significant effects on price"
and is "not generally available" (analogs to the elements
of "material" and "nonpublic" under U.S. law). 76 If so, she
may not trade on the information.
So, in Einhorn's case, it seems fair to say that any
person of ordinary intelligence, having read the
governing FSA and E.U. statutes, could have told him in

73 See, e.g., ANDERSON, pp. 246-47 (noting that materiality is a

relative concept that eludes precise definition).
74 See Council Regulation 596/2014, art. 8, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
(EU) (providing that insider trading liability arises any time "a
person possesses inside information and uses that information"
to trade or tip); Id. art. 10; Financial Services and Markets Act
2000, c.8, §118(B), (UK.); see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The
Road not Taken: A Comparison of the E. U. and U.S. Insider
Trading Prohibitions, 56 WASH. U. J.L. POLY 31, 35 (2018)
(noting that mere possession of material nonpublic information
while trading, regardless of how it was acquired, is sufficient
to incur liability under the European insider dealing regime);
Peter Henning, Einhorn Case Highlights Britain's Broader
Definition of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2012),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/einhorn-casehighlights -britains -broader-definition-of-insidertrading/?searchResultPosition=1 (noting the broad scope of the
European insider dealing regime).
75 See Greene & Schmid, supra note 66, at 386.
76 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, § 118(C),
(UK).
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advance that it didn't matter whether he obtained the
material nonpublic information on a "wall-crossed" or
"open" basis. Once he possessed the material nonpublic
information concerning the equity issuance, he would
incur liability by trading in Punch shares prior to the
announcement. 77

In sum, contrasting Cuban's and Einhorn's cases
helps to illustrate the moral superiority of the European
statutory model over the U.S. common-law model from
the standpoint of notice and due process. 78 But even if
justice requires clear statutory notice for traders, nothing
said so far suggests that justice or fairness requires that
the scope of insider trading liability under any new U.S.
statutory regime should extend so far as the European
equal-access model. The next section contrasts the
examples of Cuban and Einhorn to address this equally
important question.

III. Ethics of Trading
If Einhorn had said that his conduct resembles
insider trading under U.S. law as much as soccer
resembles football, then he would have been correct. As a
general anti-fraud statute, §10(b) insider trading liability
requires some element of deception. 79 Indeed, it was,
among other things, the SEC's inability to prove
deception that allowed Cuban to avoid liability.8 0 Under
the European parity-of-information model, however, the
absence of deception on the part of Einhorn or Greenlight
77 See sources cited supra note 69.
78 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a), (b) (2012).

80 See Bradley J. Bondi, How Cuban Scored a Home Court Win
Against the SEC, LAW 360 2 (Nov.
14, 2013),

https://www.law360.com/articles/488308/how-cuban-scored-ahome-court-win-against-the-sec (noting that the SEC failed to
prove "that Cuban deceived Mamma.com with respect to his
intent to sell his shares.").
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was irrelevant. 8 1 Einhorn expressly refused to commit to
not trade prior to the disclosure, and the disclosure was
made by Punch with this understanding. 82 Both the
Cuban and Einhorn actions were civil, but this was
simply a result of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The elements for criminal liability under both regimes
track the elements for civil liability. 83 If we begin with the
basic presumption that criminal sanctions should only be
imposed to punish or prevent conduct that is morally
wrongful, or that "unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts
or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests," 84 then there is something very troubling about
any regime that permits criminal liability for someone
like Einhorn.
First, Einhorn's conduct was not deceptive. He

made it perfectly clear to Punch prior to disclosure that
he may trade on the information disclosed. 85 Punch was
aware of this and presumably concluded that disclosure
on these terms was in the best interest of the firm and its

81 See Council Regulation 596/2014, art. 8, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
(EU) (providing that insider trading liability arises any time "a
person possesses inside information and uses that information"
to trade-without any requirement of deception).
82 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, para. 2.4.

83 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2018) (providing that a willful
violation of Rule 10b-5 is a felony that can be punished by a $5
million fine and up to 20 years imprisonment); see also
Directive 2014/57/EU, of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 16 Apr. 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market
Abuse (Market Abuse Directive), art. 3, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 185
(EU) (requiring that "[m]ember States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that insider dealing . .. constitute criminal
offences at least in serious cases and when committed
intentionally.").
84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
85 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, para. 2.4.
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shareholders. 86 There is no deception in this. 87
Second, Einhorn's conduct was not unfair.
Admittedly, Greenlight had an information advantage
over the counterparties to its transactions, but trading on
information asymmetries is not typically regarded as
unfair unless the advantage was wrongfully acquired. 88
In this case, however, the information was offered
willingly by the owner of the information for a legitimate
business purpose, and on an expressly "non-wall-crossed"
or "open" basis. 89 It seems trading on such information
would only be unfair if all trading on information
asymmetries is unfair, but few would go so far. Indeed,
market participants typically

expect that there are

information asymmetries when they trade, and they
usually presume that they possess the advantage.9 0 As
one Wall Street journalist put it, "The only reason to
invest in the market is because you think you know
something others don't."91 In a recent U.S. criminal
insider trading action, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern
86 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, paras. 2.4-

2.6.
87 See ANDERSON, supra note 66, at 208-213 (arguing that such
issuer-licensed insider trading is not deceptive).
88 It is a well-settled jurisprudential principle, at least in the
United States, that parties may profit from information
advantages acquired by legitimate means. See, e.g., Laidlaw v.
Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 195 (1817) (in such cases, no rights are
violated, and no legitimate expectations are disappointed); See
ANDERSON, supra, note 66, at 208-215.
89 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, para. 2.4.
90 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 256 (1988)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that many investors trade precisely because they
are of the opinion that the stock price does not reflect the
corporation's actual worth).
91 Jeanne Schroeder, supra note 57, at 168 (citing Thoughts
on the Business of Life, FORBES, http://thoughts.forbes.com/th
oughts/r-foster-winans (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (quoting R.

Foster Winans)).
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District of New York granted the defense's pretrial
motion to prevent prosecutors from telling the jury that
the stock market should be a "level playing field." 92 The
defense argued that "the stock market is not supposed to
be a . . . level playing field, as traders routinely seek out
ways to gain an advantage over their competitors to

increase profits."9 3 Judge Rakoff agreed, noting that
"[a]nyone who thinks that the stock market is a level
playing field obviously has no contact with reality." 94
As manager of Greenlight, Einhorn presumably
made the determination that it was not in his investors'
interests to restrict his ability to trade Punch shares by
acquiring material nonpublic information on a "wallcrossed" basis. 95 Punch accepted this decision and
nevertheless presumably decided it was in its investors'
interests to share the information with Greenlight on an
"open," "non-wall-crossed" basis. 96 They did so.97 On these
facts, there is nothing wrongful or unfair in Einhorn's

trading on the information so acquired (other than that
such trading happens to be illegal under the European
model-and,
absent extraordinary
circumstances,
persons have a moral obligation to obey the law). 98
92 See Pete Brush, Rakoff Tells Gov't to Dump 'Level Playing
Field' Language,
LAW
360
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.law360. com/articles/ 1150320/rakoff-tells-gov-t-todump-level-playing-field-language.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, para.
2.4.
96 See id. para. 2.6.
97 Id.
98 Though the claim that citizens have an assumed moral
obligation to obey just laws that apply to them is not

uncontroversial, claims of a general political obligation have
been defended from Plato's Crito to John Rawls's A Theory of
Justice. See PLATO, FIVE DIALOGUES (G.M.A. Grube trans.,
John M. Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2002); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF

JUSTICE 350 (1971) ("There is quite clearly no difficulty in
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Indeed, I would go so far as to argue that, absent the legal
proscription, given Einhorn's fiduciary duty to his
investors, it would be wrongful not to order the trading in
accord with his best judgment on these facts. Finally,
given Einhorn's position as controlling 13.3 percent of
Punch's outstanding shares, and that any liquidation of
those shares in advance of the PIPE offering might have
upset the company's plans, it is possible that the Punch
executives were anxious to disclose inside information to
Einhorn precisely to prevent him from being able to
trade.99 If that was indeed part of the Punch executives'
motivation for sharing material nonpublic information,
then Einhorn may have been the victim of what Professor
Andrew Verstein has termed "insider tainting," the
"weaponizing" of broad insider trading prohibitions by
issuers to paralyze large shareholders and prevent them
from trading.0 0 In light of the above considerations,
perhaps it is the legal proscription, rather than the
conduct in violation of it, that warrants the greater moral
condemnation.
Of course, the fact that there is nothing morally
impermissible in Einhorn's conduct does not force the
conclusion that it should not be criminalized. Indeed,
historically, a large number of so-called "white collar
crimes" are categorized by the courts and jurists alike as
malum prohibitum (wrong only because prohibited).1oi In
explaining why we are to comply with just laws enacted under
a just constitution. In this case the principles of natural duty
and the principle of fairness establish the requisite duties and
MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND
A.J. SIMMONS,
obligations.");
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 12 (1979).
99 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 17, para. 2.2.
100 Verstein, supra note 32, at 725.

See, e.g., State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (N.C. 1905)
(explaining that "[a]n offense malum in se is properly defined
as one which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a
civilized community, whereas an act malum prohibitum is
wrong only because made so by statute."); see also Hentzner v.
State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980) (noting, for example,
101
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fact, in the context of "public welfare offenses," where the
risk of public harm from otherwise morally blameless
conduct is sufficiently great, the criminal law will
sometimes impose sanctions as a prophylactic without

the requirement of any evidence of a mens rea.10 2 The
criminal penalties for such public welfare offenses are,
however, typically minimal.10 3 Assuming arguendo such
criminal sanctions are sometimes justified,10 4 there is
little reason to think that any social harm resulting from
insider trading along the lines of that committed by
Einhorn is sufficiently great to warrant the extreme
measure. I have argued elsewhere (in agreement with a
host of others) that it is unlikely issuer-licensed insider
trading like Einhorn's will result in any net negative

economic consequences for the owner of the information,
for the counterparties to the transaction, or for the
broader market.1 0 5 If there are any net negative
consequences for such trading, however, they are
unlikely to rise to a level of magnitude that would
warrant the imposition of criminal sanctions against
moral innocents as a mere prophylactic. Indeed, Europe's
historically anemic criminal enforcement of its insider
trading laws suggests that many of its prosecutors may
agree.10 6
that "[t]he crime of offering to sell or selling unregistered
securities is malum prohibitum, not malum in se." (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted)).

See, e.g., Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 252-256 (1952)
(describing the nature and origin of public welfare offenses).
103 Id. at 256.
104 See id. at 254 (noting that the "[c]onsequences of a general
abolition of intent as an ingredient of serious crimes have
aroused the concern of responsible and disinterested students
102

of penology.").
105
106

See ANDERSON, supra note 66, at 202-206.
See, e.g., James H. Thompson, A Global Comparison of Insider

Trading Regulations, 3 INT'L J. OF ACCT. AND FIN. REPORTING 1, 6-7
(2013); see also Hugo Miller, In Land of Discretion, no Jail for
Swiss Insider Trading, BLOOMBERG, (Dec. 3, 2018, 12:00 AM),
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IV. Conclusion
In sum, the examples of Cuban and Einhorn help
to illustrate some moral reasons why (1) the U.S. should
follow Europe's lead in implementing a statutory insider
trading enforcement regime, but unlike Europe, (2) any
new U.S. insider trading regime should take care to only
impose liability on trading that is morally wrongful.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/swissinside-traders-dodge-j ail-in-land-where-discretion-rules
(noting that "criminal convictions remain rare" in Germany).
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